Recent studies have reported the success of linear prediction analysis (LPA)-related features, which are extracted as a short-term spectral feature for replay attack detection due to the advantage of the imperfection in the LPA-based signal produced by recording and playback devices. However, exploiting LPA-based signals is focused on only magnitude-based features and ignores phase-based features. In this paper, we propose two novel LPA-based relative phase features, namely, linear prediction residual-based relative phase (LPR-RP) and linear prediction analysis estimated speech-based relative phase (LPAES-RP).
I. INTRODUCTION
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) is a process of accepting/rejecting the claimed identities on the basis of provided speech samples [1] , [2] . Recently, ASV technologies have been utilized in many modern speech applications [3] - [5] . However, modern ASV systems are required to be robust against spoofing attacks [6] . These spoofing attacks can be The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Shiqing Zhang . divided into four types: impersonation, replay, text-to-speech (TTS) synthesis, and speech conversion [4] , [7] . Among various spoofing attacks, replay attacks that are easily mounted using recordings of a genuine speaker's speech and replayed to deceive an ASV system, have been proven to dramatically degrade the detection performance of ASV systems [8] .
In this paper, we focus on replay attack detection, which is a task of determining genuine speech or a replayed signal.
Several replay attack detection systems have been pro-posed for detecting replayed signals from genuine speech. They are classified into two categories; one focuses on features [9] - [12] ], and the other focuses on classifiers [13] - [18] . In this paper, we focus on feature extraction.Most of the countermeasures used in previous studies have concentrated on magnitude spectrum features. Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC), inverse MFCC (IMFCC), subband spectral centroid frequency coefficients (SCFC), and subband spectral centroid magnitude coefficients (SCMC) were proposed in [9] . The high-frequency features of constant Q cepstral coefficients (CQCC) were proposed in [10] . Amplitude weighted frequency cosine coefficients (AWFCC) [11] , mel filterbank slope (MFS) [12] , and linear filterbank slope [12] were proposed for replay attack detection tasks. Power normalized cepstral coefficients (PNCC) and Q-Log normalized cepstral coefficients (QLNCC) were proposed in [20] , In addition to using the previously mentioned individual features, fusion systems have also been proposed for combining scores from different feature/classifier-based replay attack detection [11] , [20] . The fused system of the AWFCC and CQCC was implemented in [11] . The combination of QLNCC/PNCC and CQCC was proposed in [20] . In all these features, the decision for detecting genuine speech from replay speech is strongly based on the magnitude spectrum information of short-time spectral analysis obtained from original/raw speech. However, the magnitude spectrum information of original/raw speech via short-time spectral analysis is weak for detecting replayed signals as modern recording, and playback devices can maintain the average spectral patterns of original speech in replayed signals [21] . Thus, a source of alternative information for feature extraction is required to counter the replayed signal.
Linear prediction residual (LPR) signals that are computed using linear prediction analysis (LPA) [22] , has attracted attention in spoofing attack detection [23] - [25] because the LPR is highly affected by the distortion of spoofing process; thus, the difference between original speech and spoofing signal can be found and is anticipated to be useful for spoofing attack countermeasures. In [24] , LPR Hilbert envelope cepstral coefficients (LPRHEC) were proposed to detect voice conversion/synthesized signals from genuine speech. The LPRHEC feature captures the magnitude information of LPR signals via short-term spectral analysis. The results showed that the LPRHEC feature can provide promising results on the detection of voice conversion/synthesized signal because of the imperfection of LPR produced by the spoofing attack process. In [26] , the peak-to-sidelobe ratio of the Hilbert envelope of linear prediction residual (PSRMS) that directly considers the LPR for replayed signal detection was introduced and provided encouraging performance for replay attack detection because of the different information derived from the mean and skewness of PSRMS between speech and replayed signals. The residual mel-frequency cepstral coefficient (RMFCC or LPR-MFCC) [27] , linear frequency residual cepstral coefficient (LFRCC) [29] , and LPR Hilbert envelope mel-frequency cepstral coefficient (LPRHEMFCC) features [25] were proposed as the representative features for replay attack detection. The result reported that the LPR-MFCC, LFRCC, and LPRHEMFCC, modeling the magnitude information based on LPR using mel/linear/invertmel-cepstral analysis, were the compact representation for the detection of replayed signal because the spectral pattern of LPR has the fluctuation differences of genuine speech and replayed signal, which are very useful in feature extraction. In addition to the use of single features, combining LPR-MFCCLPRCC/LPRHEMFCC/PSRMS with MFCC/CQCC can achieve additional improvement due to the complementary nature based on different feature-based classifiers. In all these studies, the feature performance depends on the magnitude spectrum information from the LPR via short-term spectral analysis and the peak values of the LPR signals [26] . However, there are few works focusing on exploiting LPR signal for phase feature extraction via short-term spectral analysis because of the inflexibility of phase computation [30] .
Recently, various phase-based features have been successful in replay attack detection [27] , [28] , [31] , [32] . The authors of [31] proposed a linear frequency modified group delay coefficient (LFMGDCC) to detect replayed signals from genuine speech. The result reported that the LFMGDCC feature and combining it with MFCC/CQCC showed encouraging results for replay attack detection because of the sensitiveness to noise. Nonetheless, the authors of [27] , [31] reported that the LFMGDCC contains both magnitude and phase information, which may make it difficult to detect replayed signals from genuine speech and has a less complementary nature for combining with the system using magnitude features. The LPR phase cepstral coefficient (LPRPCC) was proposed in [28] and provided effective phase information, which can effectively be combined with systems using magnitude-based features at the score level. Nevertheless, based on the cosine of the analytic signal phase function reported in [28] , the phase information of LPRPCC provided a slight difference between genuine speech and replayed signals, which may make replayed signal detection ineffective. The discrete cosine transform-linear-relative phase shift (DCT-Linear-RPS) that exploits the harmonic modeling of speech signals was introduced in [27] , and the instantaneous frequency cosine coefficient (IFCC) feature along with MFCC, LPR-MFCC, CQCC, discrete cosine transform of integrated LP residual (DCTILPR) was proposed in [33] . The results showed that the DCT-Linear-RPS and IFCC provided promising results with phase information, especially in the combination of the DCT-linear-RPS/IFCC and CQCC/other features because the phase information of the DCT-linear-RPS and IFCC feature is extracted using only phase information, and thus, has a strong complementary nature with magnitude-based MFCC/CQCC features. However, the phase shift variation in the DCT-Linear-RPS and IFCC are not normalized by cutting positions. Moreover, the DCT-linear-RPS is extracted at only harmonic frequencies of the fundamental frequency, and the unwrapped phase spectrum is not enhanced using sine and cosine functions; therefore, the phase shift information loses some critical information for replay attack detection. In our previous work [34] - [38] , a phase-based feature called the relative phase (RP) feature was proposed and provided encouraging performance against spoofing attacks (replay, speech synthesis, and speech conversion). The advantage of the RP feature is that it extracts accurate phase information from given speech since the phase variation is significantly normalized by cutting positions, followed by both the cosine function and sine function. Although the RP has been successfully implemented for spoofing attack detection, its discriminating ability for replay attack detection can be further improved using a frequency resolution. In our previous work [36] - [39] , mel/inverted mel-scale filterbank, linear-scale filterbank, attention-based adaptive filterbank, and gammatone-scale filterbank were applied to convert the RP information from the original linear scale to new scales (such as mel-scale, inverted mel-scale, and gammatone-scale), where the modified RP information is called mel-scale RP [37] , inverted mel-scale RP (IMel-RP) [36] , linear-scale RP (linear-RP) [36] , adaptive scale RP (ARP) [38] , gammatone-scale RP (gamatone-RP) [39] , respectively. The results demonstrated that the mel-RP, ARP, and gammatone-RP outperformed the original RP feature due to the frequency resolution of the filterbank. Moreover, additional improvement could be obtained by combining the mel-RP/ARP/gammatone-RP with MFCC/IMFCC/CQCC at score level, especially in the combination of the gammatone-RP and CQCC yielding the best result compared with the related auditory filterbank-based RP features [36] - [39] . However, the modified phase information using the filterbank may lose some information for score combination with magnitude-based features. In the aforementioned RP features, we focused on modifying the RP feature with the multiple kinds of filterbanks for improving the discriminating ability. However, considering a source of the alternative information having distortion of the recording/playback process is discarded for extracting RP information. In fact, the spectral information derived from the original/raw speech signal has the slight imperfection obtained by the distortion of the recording/playback process that may not be effective input of RP feature extraction. Recent studies [24] , [25] have indicated that the imperfection produced by recording and playback devices is a crucial clue for improving the performance of feature extraction. Thus, it is expected that the extraction of the RP feature with LPA-based signals may provide better performance than the RP feature using the original/raw speech signal.
In this paper, we modify RP feature extraction using two linear prediction analysis-based signals, that is, LPR and LPR estimated speech (LPAES) signals, instead of the original/raw speech signal for replay attack detection. The modified RP feature using LPR is called the LPR-based relative phase (LPR-RP) feature, and the modified RP feature using LPAES signals is called the LPAES-based relative phase (LPAES-RP) feature. Based on the LPA of speech signal via DFT, the phase spectral formants have distinct changes between genuine speech and replayed signal; thus, it is expected that the phase information of the LPR and LPAES signal is anticipated to provide better distinction than using the original/raw speech signal for RP feature extraction. In addition to using an individual LPR-RP/LPAES-RP feature, our proposed LPR-RP and LPAES-RP feature are also combined with two standard features: Mel-frequency cepstral coefficient (MFCC), constant Q transform cepstral coefficient (CQCC), and the original RP feature at score-level to further improve the detection decision performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The motivation for using the phase information based on linear prediction analysis of speech for replay attack detection is described in Section II. Our proposed linear prediction residual signal-based relative phase features are introduced in Section III. In Section IV, the replay attack detection setup is described, which includes the details of the database, features, classifier, and performance criteria. Section V presents the results and discussions for a replay attack detection task, and our conclusion is presented in Section VI.
II. THE MOTIVATION FOR USING THE PHASE INFORMATION BASED ON A LINEAR PREDICTION ANALYSIS-BASED SPEECH SIGNAL
In recent studies [21] , [25] , [27] , the magnitude of LPR spectra via the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) has been proven to be powerful for replay attack detection. This is because the magnitude of replayed LPR spectra is highly affected by the distortion of recording and playback devices, which is different from the magnitude of genuine LPR spectra. Although the magnitude of LPR spectra via DFT has been proven to be efficient to counter replayed signals, the use of LPR is ignored for phase-based feature extraction. Here, the phase of LPR spectra is analyzed in this paper. Moreover, the LPAES signal based on the spectra via DFT is also explored for replay attack detection. Fig. 1 (a-f) shows the time domain representation and magnitude spectra of genuine and replayed speech segments, their corresponding LPR signal, and their corresponding LPAES signal. In the time domain, we can see that the formants of the raw speech, LPR, and LPAES signals are ambiguous due to similar changes in genuine speech and replayed signals. Therefore, extracting features from direct speech/LPR/LPAES signal without some signal enhancement processing may not achieve good performance. In the spectral domain, the magnitude spectrum formants of the speech signal in the replayed signal remain almost unchanged due to the use of high-quality devices in the ASVspoof 2017 challenge 1 ; thus, it seems that the magnitude spectrum formants based on raw speech signals are weak for discriminating replayed signals. In contrast, it can be seen that the magnitude spectra between genuine and replayed LPR signals is noticeably different because the LPR information based on an excitation source is very sensitive to variations in the session/channel, as presented in [40] . This fact allows the magnitude-based feature derived from LPR to detect replayed signals. When we analyze the magnitude information of LPAES spectra, it can be observed that the magnitude spectrum of LPAES is similar to the magnitude spectrum of raw speech signals because LPA estimated speech may not significantly lose the magnitude spectrum formants of the original speech signal. Consequently, this fact motivates us to believe that the magnitude information of LPAES spectra cannot provide better performance than the magnitude information of the LPR spectra. Fig. 1 (m-r) shows the phase spectra of genuine and replayed speech segments, their corresponding LPR signal, and their corresponding LPAES signal. In the spectral domain, it can be observed that the phase information of the original/raw speech via short-time spectral analysis has significant differences between genuine speech and replayed signals because the phase information of replayed speech signals is affected due to the environmental changes during recording. Therefore, the phase information of raw/original speech is effective for detecting replayed signals as reported in [27] , [31] , [32] , [41] . When analyzing the phase of LPR and LPAES spectra, we observe that the phase of both LPR and LPAES spectra can provide significant differences between genuine speech and replayed signals. First, from both LPR and LPAES spectra, it can be seen that there are obvious changes in the phase spectral formants between genuine speech and replayed signals because the phase information of replayed LPR and LPAES signals is highly affected by distortion, introduced from the playback process. Second, it is almost certain that the phase of LPAES can provide more distinct information than the phase of the original/raw speech spectra because exploiting LPA to estimate speech makes the phase information more sensitive to the playback process. The facts motivate us to believe that the phase of LPR and LPAES spectra are efficient for replay attack detection.
III. LINEAR PREDICTION ANALYSIS-BASED RELATIVE PHASE FEATURES A. ORIGINAL RELATIVE PHASE (RP)
The spectrum X (ω) of a signal is calculated by DFT of an input speech signal sequence x(n):
where |X (ω, t)| and θ (ω, t) are the magnitude and phase spectra at frequency ω and time t, respectively. However, the framing position of the input speech at the same frequency ω mainly causes changes in the phase information [42] . To resolve the problem of phase variation obtained by frame position, and the phase at a certain base frequency ω is kept constant, the phase of other frequencies is computed using the set frequency. For example, if the phase of base frequency ω is set to 0, we can obtain the spectrum as the following equation:
While the other frequency ω is equal to 2π f , we can obtain the following spectrum:
In this way, we can further normalize the phase information as the following equation:
Nevertheless, there is a problem with this equation based on comparing two phase values, as observed in [42] . To overcome the problem, the phase information is mapped into coordinates on a unit circle:
Although the final phase informationθ can normalize the phase variation using the cutting position and can reduce the phase variation problem, the normalized phase variation is still ineffective due to the problem of different cutting positions, readers are referred to [34] . To overcome the problem, the pseudo pitch synchronization method, which is introduced before the DFT process, as shown in Fig. 2(a) , is applied to synchronize the splitting section with the pseudo pitch cycle, as suggested in [34] and [35] . This method looks for the maximum amplitude at the center of the conventional splitting section of an utterance waveform, and the peak of the utterance waveform is used as the center of the next corresponding window. Therefore, the center of the frame contains the maximum amplitude in all frames.
B. LINEAR PREDICTION RESIDUAL-BASED RELATIVE PHASE (LPR-RP)
From the previous subsection, the original RP feature extraction is introduced for our experiment. Our previous works reported that RP using the original/raw speech signal could provide good performance in speaker speaker recognition/verification tasks [42] and the detection of synthesized speech/voice conversion [35] . However, the RP feature extraction capturing linear prediction residual (LPR) has been less studied for detecting replayed signals from genuine speech.
In this paper, we propose a novel LPR-based relative phase (LPR-RP) feature for replay attack detection. In fact, in place of the original/raw speech signal, the LPR is used as the input signal for RP feature extraction. The strength of LPR is that the spectral patterns in replayed signals are highly affected by distortion introduced from the playback process, as described in the previous section. The LPR signal is derived from the prediction error between the original speech samples and estimated speech samples given by
where x(n) is given raw speech signals, andx(n) is the estimated speech using LP analysis which is based on a linear combination of its p previous samples by [43] ,
where p represents the prediction orders, and {a k } represents the LP coefficients. Here, we modify the RP feature extraction using LPR signals instead of the original speech signal. The process of LPR-RP feature extraction is shown in Fig. 2 .
Here, The LPR is first calculated for every frame of 20 ms with a shift of 10 ms as introduced in [27] and [25] ; after that; the total frames of the calculated LPR signal are overlapped for every frame of 20 ms with a shift of 10 ms to produce the final input signal. The remaining process is the same as the original RP feature extraction.
C. LINEAR PREDICTION ANALYSIS ESTIMATED SPEECH-BASED RELATIVE PHASE (LPAES-RP)
Inspired by Section II, there is the possibility that the phase of linear prediction analysis estimated speech (LPRES) can provide more distinct information than the phase of original/raw speech spectra because using LPA makes the phase information more distinct for replay attack detection. In this paper, we modify RP using LPAES signals instead of original/raw speech signals. The modified RP is called LPAES-RP. Fig. 2 shows the process of LPAES-RP feature extraction. Here, we first compute the LPAES signal for every frame of 20 ms with a shift of 10 ms and overlap the computed LPAES frames for every frame of 20 ms with a shift of 10 ms to yield the input signal for LPAES-RP feature extraction. The remaining process has the same process as the original RP feature extraction.
IV. REPLAY ATTACK DETECTION SETUP A. DATABASE
ASVspoof 2017 version 2 database is used in the experiments. The database is partitioned into three subsets, including a training subset, a development subset, and an evaluation subset. All three subsets are not overlapped in the term of speakers [44] , [45] .
• Training subset: The training subset consists of 1,507 genuine speech and 1,507 replayed signals from 10 male speakers. Replayed samples originated from three replayed conditions in six different sessions. The training subset was collected at a single location. In this paper, the training subset was used to train the replay attack detection system when it was evaluated with the development subset, as suggested in [46] .
• Development subset: The development subset includes genuine speech and replayed signal recordings from a total of 8 speakers. The total number of genuine speech samples is 760, and the total number of replayed signals is 950. The replayed samples originated from 10 different sessions with 10 replayed conditions. The development subset was recorded in three locations where one location is identical to the training subset. We utilize the development subset to optimize the replay attack detection system and pooled with the training subset to train the final replay attack detection when tested with the evaluation subset, as suggested in [46] .
• Evaluation subset: The evaluation set consists of 1,298 genuine and 12,008 replayed speech signals from a total of 24 speakers. Replayed speech samples originated from 110 replayed speech conditions in 161 different sessions. The evaluation subset was based on different conditions from training and development subsets. In this paper, we use the evaluation subset to investigate the final replay attack detection system. Table 1 summarizes all three subsets of ASVspoof 2017 version 2. Further details of the ASVspoof 2017 database can be seen in [44] and [45] .
B. FEATURE EXTRACTION
In the experiments, we use mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) and constant Q cepstral coefficients (CQCCs) as baseline features for replay attack detection. Moreover, the original RP feature is also used to compare the proposed LPR-RP and LPAES-RP features.
MFCC features [47] are extracted using a 20 ms frame length and 10 ms frameshift. Discrete Fourier transform (DFT) for every 512 samples is used to compute the magnitude spectrum with 256 components. The magnitude spectrum is processed through a bank of 13 triangularly shaped filters spaced in mel-scale. In the last process, MFCC feature vectors are obtained using a discrete cosine transform (DCT) of logarithmic filterbank outputs. In this paper, a total of 39 dimensions (13 MFCCs, 13 MFCCs, 13 MFCCs) of MFCC features are used in our experiment. CQCC features [48] , [49] are extracted using the constant Q transform (CQT), which transforms speech signals into the frequency domain from the time domain. Then, the magnitude spectrum obtained by the CQT is used to calculate the logarithm octave power spectrum. Next, the logarithm linear power spectrum is calculated using uniform resampling based on the logarithm octave power spectrum. Finally, the DCT of logarithm linear power spectrum outputs is used to obtain CQCC features. In this paper, we follow the standard CQCC parameters provided by ASVspoof 2017 database. The CQCC feature has 96 bins-per-octave and 16 uniform samples in the first octave to 256. The 90-dimensional CQCC features (30 CQCCs, 30 CQCCs, 30 CQCCs) are used in the experiment.
RP features [34] are calculated using a 12.5 ms frame length, 5 ms frameshift, and 2.5 ms frame range of pseudo pitch synchronization. Phase spectrum with 128 components is computed using the DFT for every 256 samples. The phase spectrum is then normalized by cosine and sine function to obtain RP features. In this paper, 38-dimensional RP feature vectors (i.e., 19 sinθ and 19 cosθ ) are used as suggested by [34] , [35] , [37] , [38] .
LPR-RP features are extracted using the same parameters with original RP feature extraction, except for speech signal input replaced by the LPR signal. Here, we use 16 kHz sampling frequency directly. We use 38-dimensional LPR-RP vectors (i.e., 19 sinθ and 19 cosθ ) for replay attack detection.
The LPR signals are extracted using a 20 ms frame length and 10 ms frameshift after the total extracted LPR signal segments are overlapped using a 20 ms frame length and 10 ms frameshift to produce the input LPR signal of the LPR-RP feature extraction. The optimal LP order the LPR-RP feature extraction for the LPAES-RP feature extraction is analyzed in Section V-A.
LPAES-RP features are extracted using the same parameters with the LPR-RP feature extraction, except for using the LPAES in place of LPR. Therefore, 16 kHz sampling frequency is used for the feature extraction, 38-dimensional LPAES-RP vectors (i.e., 19 sinθ and 19 cosθ ) are used for replay attack detection. In this way, with the LPR feature extraction, the optimal LP order for the LPAES-RP feature extraction is also analyzed in Section V-A.
C. CLASSIFIER
Although there are various classifiers such as the Gaussian mixture model (GMM) [50] , i-vector, deep neural networks (DNN) [51] , [52] , convolutional neural networks (CNN), light convolutional neural networks (LCNN) [53] , recurrent neural networks (RNN) [13] , and residual networks (ResNet) [53] , that can be used for replay attack detection, the implementation of GMM is very simple and yields good performance on antispoofing countermeasures and text-dependent ASV tasks [54] , [55] . Furthermore, the ASVspoof 2017 challenge used a GMM classifier as the baseline classifier. Therefore, we use the GMM classifier for replayed speech detection in the experiments. The decision of whether the given speech is human or replayed speech is computed by the logarithmic likelihood ratio as:
where O is the given feature vector of the input speech, and λ genuine and λ replay define the GMMs for genuine speech and replayed signals, respectively. The MFCC, CQCC, RP, proposed LPR-RP, and proposed LPAES-RP features are used as the input features.
Here, two GMMs for genuine and replayed speech models have 512-components which are trained based on maximum likelihood estimation with expectation maximization algorithm, on genuine and replayed utterances.
Inspired by the success of score combination [32] , it can be noted that the magnitude and phase information has a strong complementary nature leading to the detection decision improvement in many speech classification systems [30] , [42] , [56] . In this paper, the linear combination suggested in [30] is applied to obtain a new decision score L comb :
where α denotes the weighting coefficients, L 1 is the GMM likelihood of the first selected feature, L 2 is is the GMM likelihood of the second selected feature, andL 1 andL 2 are the averaged L 1 and L 2 over all the training data, respectively.
D. PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
Equal error rate (EER) corresponding to the operating point with equal miss and false alarm rates is used as the performance criterion. In this paper, we use the available Bosaris Toolkit implementation 2 provided by the ASVspoof 2017 challenge to compute the EER.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS A. RESULTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT SUBSET
This subsection reports the EERs evaluated using the development subset. Since the order of prediction of the LP analysis has an effect on the performance of LPR-RP and LPAES-RP features [24] , we first determine the suitable LP order for LPR-RP and LPAES-RP features used for replay attack detection. Fig. 3 shows the performance of the LPR-RP and LPAES-RP feature in different LP orders compared to the original RP feature. It can be seen that all results of the LPR-RP feature using different LP orders were not superior to the original RP feature because the phase information of LPR cannot make the distinction under similar training subsets when compared to the phase information of the raw speech signal. Additionally, the total results of the LPAES-RP features based on different LP orders outperformed original RP features because the LPAES signal makes a distinction between genuine speech and replayed signals introduced by the distortion of the recording/playback process. Here, it can be seen that LPR-RP and LPAES-RP at various LP orders provided slightly different results because LP orders in the range from 8 to 20 still retain the important information in all the resonance of the vocal tract system as summarized in [22] . However, the best performance of the LPR-RP feature was obtained at the 12 th LP order (p = 12) giving the EER of 21.54% while the LPAES-RP feature at the 9 th LP order (p = 9) giving the EER of 15.36% was the best result in comparison with other LP orders. As a result, the LPR-RP at the 12 th LP order and LPAES-RP at the 9 th LP order were used to combine/compare with two baseline features (MFCC and CQCC). The results are shown in Table 2 . By comparing the CQCC on the development subset, we notice that our proposed LPR-RP and LPAES-RP features did not perform as well as we expected. The reason might be that the magnitude-based discrimination power of the CQCC feature provided more exceptional performance under similar conditions with the training subset.
Next, we also analyzed the effectiveness of the multi- result. Second, it can be observed that combining the proposed LPR-RP/LPAES-RP with MFCC/CQCC provided significant performance improvement compared to individual features. This is because phase and magnitude-based features definitely have a complementary nature [27] , [41] . Finally, the results revealed that the combination of LPAES-RP and CQCC provided the best performance at 3.31% compared with other features and combinations because the speech signal could be efficiently captured using the CQCC feature extraction that is obvious for replay attack detection; thus, combining CQCC with the proposed LPAES-RP features performed better than combining the proposed LPR-RP/LPAES-RP with the MFCC/RP/LPR-RP feature.
B. RESULTS ON THE EVALUATION SUBSET
This subsection presents the EERs investigated in the evaluation dataset. The evaluation subset has unseen configurations (real-world-based devices) from those in the training and development subset, whereas the development subset reported in the previous subsection has a similar (seen) configuration with the training subset. This suggests that the performance on the evaluation subset is more important than the performance on the development subset for real-world applications. The results on the evaluation subset are shown in Table 2 .
As discussed in the previous subsection, our proposed features with the suitable LP order were reported on the development set. Therefore, the LPAES-RP at the 12 th LP order and LPAES-RP at the 9 th LP order were also used to compare/combine two baseline features (MFCC and CQCC). In Table 2 , we observe from LPR-RP and LPAES-RP that the results on the development set were better than the results on the evaluation set were because the phase information may be more sensitive to the unknown recording and playback devices as well as environments that do not appear in the training set. The same tendency can be found in [28] , [33] . Next, we compared the proposed LPR-RP and LPAES-RP features with two baseline features and the original RP feature. It can be observed that our proposed LPR-RP and LPAES-RP giving the EER of 14.69% and 13.53% respectively, were superior to MFCC, CQCC, and the original RP, having the EER of 31.84%, 23.27%, and 15.39%, respectively. This is because the phase information of LPR and LPAES spectra under real-world-based devices provides the distinction between genuine speech and replayed signals.
In the last set of our experiments on the evaluation subset, we compared the result obtained using the multiple phase combination of the proposed LPR-RP/LPAES-RP+RP with other features (MFCC/CQCC/RP). First, we notice that the combination of our proposed LPR-RP/LPR-RP with the original RP achieved improved results compared to the individual LPR-RP/LPAES-RP/RP feature. This is because the performance of the original RP was not too different from the results of our proposed LPR-RR and LPAES-RP; thus, combining phase features achieved additional improvement despite using only phase information. Second, it can be seen that the combined score of our proposed LPR-RP/LRPDS-RP and CQCC exhibited better performance than the combination of the LPR-RP/LPAES-RP and RP. This is because LPR-RP/LPAES-RP and CQCC have a strong complementary nature, as described in the previous subsection. Finally, when compared with the combined score of LPR-RP/LPAES-RP and MFCC/CQCC/RP, it is obvious that combining the fused scores of LPR-RP and RP (LPR-RP+RP)/LPAES-RP and RP (LPAES-RP+RP) with CQCC were the two best performances giving an EER of 9.26% and 9.69%, respectively, because the replay attack detection using the combined scores of LRP-RP/LPAES-RP and RP achieved the two best results compared to the related phase combination; thus, combining them with CQCC performed better than combining the proposed LPR-RP/LPAES-RP with MFCC/CQCC/RP. Next, the results of the proposed methods were also compared with other features in recent publications, where we selected the single and combined systems based on GMM-based classification to have a fair comparison for the detection performance. The performance comparison can be separated into two parts. In the first part, we compared the single proposed LPR-RP/LPAES-RP-based system with signal feature-based systems in other recent research publications. The LPR-MFCC and DCTILPR suggested in [33] provided better performance than the method using MFCC/QLNCC/PNCC because the magnitude of LPR signal spectra and DCTILPR provided the difference between genuine speech and replayed signal; thus, it makes feature representation effective for replay attack detection. Nevertheless, the magnitude-based features are sensitive to noise. By comparing the proposed LPR-RP/LPAES-RP with the LPR-MFCC, we noticed that the phase-based feature provided encouraging performance for replay attack detection. Likewise, the LFMGDCC in [41] and DCT-linear-RPS in [41] , IFCC [33] , mel-RP in [36] , and gammatone-RP in [39] were confirmed to be efficient phase features under unseen evaluation. However, the LFMGDCC feature may lose some representation in the vocal source information of the given speech due to the enhancements of the envelope of the short-time speech spectrum, and the phase shift variation in the DCT-Linear-RPS is not normalized by cutting positions. Moreover, they are still based on the raw speech signal. Thus, both LFMGDCC and DCT-Linear-RPS may lose some information for detecting a replayed signal. When the proposed LPAES-RP was compared with [33] , [39] and [41] , we observed that the proposed LPR-RP/LPAES-RP outperformed the LFMGDCC, DCT-Linear-RPS and IFCC and provided a similar result to mel-RP and gammatone-RP because the LPR-RP/LPAES-RP feature efficiently captures/normalizes the phase information of LPR/LPAES spectra by cutting positions, the sine and cosine function are applied to the unwrapped phase spectrum. In the second part, we compared the score combination of LPR-RP/LPAES-RP and CQCC with other score combinations. It can be seen that the score combination of LPR-RP/LPAES-RP, RP, and CQCC provided better than most of the existing combination systems in the literature. The reason may be that LPR-RP and LPAES-RP are not modified with filterbank, thus combining CQCC with our proposed LPR-RP/LPAES-RP features performed better than combining CQCC with other features. Moreover, we observed that the performance of our combination systems (LPR-RP+RP+CQCC and LPAES-RP+RP+CQCC) were very close to the state-of-the-art-combination system of IFCC, MFCC, CQCC, DCTILPR, and LPR-MFCC although the combined score of our systems is derived from three features.
Finally, the performance of our proposed system was compared with some known systems that are based on different classifiers and ASVspoof 2017 version 2. Table 3 shows the result of some known systems based on both ASVspoof 2017 version 2, which are used in comparison with our proposed system. From Tables 2 and 3, we observed that the combination of LPR-RP, RP, CQCC provided better results than most of the existing systems based on ASVspoof 2017 version 2. However, the performance of the system based on [53] outperformed our proposed systems. The classifiers of [53] and our methods are different, so the result cannot be directly compared.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, LPR-RP and LPAES-RP features were proposed for replay attack detection and were also combined with two standard features (MFCC and CQCC) and the original RP feature. The performances of the proposed features were investigated using the ASVspoof 2017 version 2 database. On the development subset, although our proposed LPR-RP/LPAES-RP feature did not perform better than CQCC, combining LPR-RP/LPAES-RP with CQCC provided promising improvement. The EER was reduced from 17.91% of the MFCC, 7.56% of CQCC to 4.33% of the combination of LPR-RP and CQCC, and 3.31% of the combination of LPAES-RP and CQCC, respectively. On the evaluation subset, our proposed LPR-RP/LPAES-RP feature outperformed the MFCC, CQCC, original RP. The EER was reduced from 31.84% of the MFCC, 23.27% of CQCC, and 15.39% of the original RP to 14.69% of the LPAES-RP and 13.53% of the LPAES-RP. Moreover, the EER can be further reduced by combining the proposed LPR-RP/LPAES-RP feature with MFCC/CQCC/RP at the score level, especially in the combination of the LPR-RP, RP, and CQCC yielding the EER of 9.26%. The experimental results confirmed that the proposed LPR-RP and LPAES-RP feature were very useful for replay attack detection.
In future work, we would like to combine other magnitude-based features with the proposed feature and will attempt to investigate the effectiveness of the proposed feature on ASVspoof 2019. We have a plan to use DNN-based classifiers such as LCNN and ResNet instead of a GMM-based classifier.
